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Abstract 
 
State owned firms were said to have an excessive use of labour. The cost of job losses after 
privatization was debated but ignored due to perceived efficiency gains in the utilization of 
labour. We estimate longer time employment risk, labour use adjustment and the efficiency of 
labour utilization in the Pakistani cement industry. We conclude that firms have made significant 
adjustments in labour use and employment risks have indeed reduced. Our estimates however, 
show that long run labour use efficiency in the industry and in the privatized firms has not 
improved, but that, surprisingly, firms set-up and operated privately have experienced a decrease 
in labour efficiency. 
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1.  Introduction 
Firms need to use their inputs at an efficient rate to maximize profitability and to remain in 
business under competitive conditions. Therefore, if a firm is using more labour in the 
production process than is technically required, it will be operating below the ‘frontier’ of 
efficiency. Policy makers and academics alike take a keen interest when these relative levels of 
inefficiency appear consistently. For a very long time period, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) all 
across the world generally were accused of employing more labour compared to what was 
optimally required. Broader reforms including the transfer of ownership from public to private 
sectors were mainly aimed at making these firms efficient in the utilization of inputs including the 
workforce. The job-loss fears at the time of privatization were widespread and well documented 
across the world. These fears were debated but ignored due to anticipated labour utilization 
efficiency gains after privatization.  
 
After more than three decades of the aggressive use of privatization programmes as a policy to 
reform SOEs in developed and developing countries, there are very few influential empirical 
published studies that have investigated the impact of privatization and other broader reforms on 
the subsequent efficient use of labour by privatized firms, and how these firms have competed 
against those firms which were not privatized and remained in the public sector or firms which 
were already operating under private ownership or were set up later on. Those few empirical 
published studies of labour use efficiency have focused upon manufacturing, agricultural and 
lately banking industries (see Haouras et al 2003; Okten and Arin 2006; Liefert et al 2005; 
Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson 1995; El-Gamal and Inanoglu 2005; Jaffry et al 2008; and Das et al 
2006 on Tunisian manufacturing, Russian agriculture, Turkish manufacturing sectors, Swedish 
social security offices, the Turkish banking industry, and Indian subcontinent banking industries).  
 
Of those studies that have examined privatization, layoffs and labour use efficiency, many focus 
on calculating and interpreting ratios such as profit per employee, assets per employee and the 
number of employees in the pre and post privatization/deregulation sub-periods. Also, this has 
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to some extent been related to developed countries such as the Swedish banking sector (analysed 
by Battese et al 2000, Heshmati 2001 and Gjirja 2004) mainly due to data availability. As a result, 
detailed and sophisticated econometric analysis into labour use efficiency in the pre and post 
privatization periods for manufacturing sectors in a developing country has been relatively 
ignored. 
 
This study seeks to fill this gap in the empirical literature of industrial organization by examining 
labour use efficiency in both the pre and post privatization periods in the Pakistani cement 
industry in response to privatization and other macro-economic reforms taking place over the 
course of the 1990s. Similar to worldwide thinking, these policies were designed to allow 
privatized firms to adjust their use of labour through layoff and the golden handshake schemes. 
The main objective of the latter or labour severance schemes introduced in the Pakistani cement 
industry was to bring selected employees out of their contracts in order to reduce the workforce 
to a more efficient/sustainable level and thus to become technically more labour use efficient. 
The other broader reforms, such as abandoning the practice of state institutions’ role in setting 
output prices and the abolishing of inputs subsidies, were also aimed at making the industry more 
competitive. If firms were able to improve their labour use to a competitive level then they would 
have been successful in moving closer to the efficiency frontier in order to be able to survive the 
increased competitive pressures, which should result from increased levels of competition.  
 
By considering the above-mentioned aims of reforms and privatization policy and related 
adjustments in workforce of the state owned firms, some obvious but interesting empirical 
questions arise. Did the management of privatized firms make economically justified adjustments 
to labour use? Did these reforms lead to long-run labour use efficiency gains? Did the initial 
reduction in workforce before privatization reduce the subsequent employment risks? Were these 
labour use adjustments and resulting anticipated efficiency gains of privatized firms comparable 
to other competitor privately owned firms? Was the contribution of reforms, and other factors 
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such as macroeconomic conditions, and product demand conditions the same over a longer post 
reforms period in enhancing labour use efficiency or did some factors contribute relatively more? 
 
Our study tries to answer the above mentioned questions by utilizing a two decades of post 
reforms and privatization data. We employ a panel data set, comprised of operational data from 
the Pakistani cement industry over the pre and post privatization periods (1986 to 2011). This 
study period represents 4-5 complete business cycles and should provide a comprehensive 
picture of adjustments in labour use in the post liberalization and privatization period. 
Specifically, a majority of similar type studies mentioned above have not used a data set that 
encompasses the full range of a significant period of reform. Furthermore, the choice of cement 
industry as a case study is interesting one due to its contribution in employment generation, tax 
collection and more importantly its relatively high propensity of being subject to allegations of 
collusions and cartel practices worldwide. The Pakistani cement industry has also been under 
intense scrutiny since the privatization in early 1990s and provides an interesting setting to see 
that rents due to alleged illegal practices were shared with workers or not which is often 
anticipated in industrial organization literature.     
 
Five important conclusions could be drawn from our empirical estimates. First, firms responded 
in their demand for labour to changes in output, wages and capacity levels. Second, labour demand 
became less responsive to changes in the wage rates in the later period of the sample period. 
Third, employment risk has come down significantly over time and in particular from 1997 to 
2011. The variable ‘wages’ is the most crucial factor contributing to the risk of employment but 
this wage related risk has come down since the initiation of reforms in 1991/92. Fourth, overall 
median labour use technical efficiency is 87%, and private firms becoming relatively less efficient 
in terms of labour usage, followed by public firms since 1997. Fifth, our multivariate regression to 
find the determinants of labour use efficiency, confirms that after controlling firm size, 
production technology, levels of working capital, exporting experience and geographical location 
of the firm, privatized firms did outperform competitor firms that were set up and operated by 
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the private sector. This cannot be said of those firms that remained under public ownership 
during our sample period.   
 
The rest of the paper is comprised of six more sections. Section 2 discusses the main 
developments and reforms in the Pakistani cement industry alongside the current state of play. 
The next section is comprised of the methodology in terms of basic theory and concepts, 
specification of an empirical model and estimation strategy. Data requirements and sources are 
discussed in section 4. Section 5 contains empirical findings and the last section (section 6) 
summarizes the main conclusions.    
 
2.  Broader Reforms and Privatization in the Pakistani Cement 
Industry  
Cement manufacturing is a well-established industry in Pakistan, accounting for about 5.5% of 
total industrial production, representing 1.4% of GDP and contributing 30 billion Rupees 
annually to the national exchequer. In January 1972, the cement industry was nationalized, and all 
the firms were placed under the Board of Industrial Management (BOIM). At the beginning of 
the financial year, 1986-87, the Pakistani cement industry consisted of 17 firms, with an aggregate 
nominal installed capacity of 7.7 million tonnes per year (tpy). Thirteen of the firms, comprising 
about 6.0 million tpy (78% of total capacity) belonged to a government holding company called 
State Cement Corporation (SCCP) and the remaining 4 firms with installed capacity of 1.63 
million (tpy) were operating under private ownership. Since then, new private firms had entered 
the market and some older firms have been acquired by competitors. 
  
The partial privatization of the state owned cement manufacturer firms commenced in 1984, 
when the first attempt was made by SCCP to divest part of its shares in Zeal Pak and Gharibwal 
Cement through the enterprise mutual fund of the Investment Corporation of Pakistan (ICP). 
Shares worth Rs.30 million were sold by SCCP to ICP at market price, which subsequently sold 
them without any difficulty, as part of a mutual fund to the public. In 1992, cement companies 
7 
 
like Dandot Cement, D.G. Khan Cement, Kohat Cement, Maple Leaf Cement, Gharibwal 
Cement, White Cement and Zealpak Cement were privatized. Out of the 8 firms privatized in the 
period 1991-92, six were sold to established industrial groups, which already had experience 
managing industrial units in Pakistan and the remaining 2 firms were sold to ‘Employee led 
Groups’1.  
 
At the time of privatization of these firms, the total numbers of employees working in different 
fields were 5,520. The government, prior to the privatization of cement producing firms, 
implemented a ‘golden handshake’ or severance scheme for the workers. The response from 
workers was encouraging, and some 20-30% of workers opted for the scheme. The government 
required a payment of 40% of the bid value at the time of the transfer of ownership. This 
amounted to Rupees 2,297.19 million at that time, and a further 2,860 million was to be paid at 
a later date. The privatization process for Thatta Cement and Mustehkam Cement was also 
completed at that time although payment was delayed, and finalized later after court cases. The 
privatization of Associated Cement, Rohri and Wah and General Refractors was completed in 
1996 and Javadan and Mustehkam Cement in 2003-06. 
 
The industry has made a significant step forward since the initiation of transfer of ownerships 
of state owned firms in 1991-92. A number of new private firms have entered and some private 
sector firms have either ceased their operation or have been merged with larger manufacturers. 
The majority of these new and old firms have listed their shares on the stock exchanges, thus 
boosting the market activity. The industry has started exporting a large quantity of cement to 
neighbouring countries and Middle East and contributions to state exchequer in the forms of 
direct and indirect taxes and foreign exchange earnings is on the rise.  
 
                                               
1 Companies owned and operated by their employees themselves, sometimes known as co-operative 
enterprises. 
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Despite these positive developments, the industry has been accused of running 
cartels/collusions and manipulating prices and supply immediately after the start of 
privatization and subsequent setting up of producers association. There have been a number of 
court cases and investigations by the regulatory authorities. Interestingly, allegation of collusion 
practices are similar to a worldwide trends for this industry. The producers association however 
have maintained that cooperation among firms is to ensure demand and supply match and 
stability in prices. Thus, the findings of this paper shall shed some light on the impact of 
perceived increased revenues on employment risks and wages if these allegation of collusions 
are considered to be true. This angle of the research shall make a significant number of readers 
interested from a number of countries from developing and developed where cement 
manufacturers have been accused of forming and running cartels.        
 
3.  Methodology 
3.1 Conceptual framework  
By following Heshmati (2001) and Bhandari and Heshmati (2005) and extending the basic 
framework to allow for specific industry and economic/operational environment, the demand for 
labour by the firm is expressed in terms of the input requirement function of Diewert (1974) as:  
 
ℎ = 𝑓(𝑦, 𝑤, 𝑞, 𝑧, 𝑡)  𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜖)  
𝜀 = 𝜇 +  𝑣           (1) 
 
Where ℎ is units of employed labour by firm measured in terms of hours worked, 𝑓 represents 
the production technology of the firm, 𝑦 represents firm output using labour, 𝑤 is the hourly 
wage rate, 𝑞 represents fixed assets (a proxy for capital) , and 𝑧 represent the firm’s 
heterogeneities in terms of the production technology constraints (firm employing advanced (dry) 
or old (wet) process production technology represented by (age) of the firm, as older firms were 
more likely to use the older wet process in our case), learning by exporting (firm is exporter), and 
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type of ownership (firm is state owned). More specifically, we aim to capture heterogeneity in 
labour input requirement by including three variables i.e. a dummy variable equal to one for 
exporter firm, log of age of the firm and the dummy variable equal to one if the firm belongs to 
the public sector.  
Age could be a proxy of vintage technology as well as an accumulation of experience over time. 
The dummy variable public ownership represents the constraint of historical baggage of 
operating in a somewhat less competitive environment with excessive employment enforced 
upon by government for political gains. Production and cost advantages, due to the acquiring of 
knowledge by competing in the international export market are well documented and we hope to 
differentiate firms by exporter status dummy variable. Finally, t represents the time effect in the 
form of the time dummy variables that could also act as a proxy for technological progress.  
 
Overall, the above function (1) represents the production possibility frontier subject to given 
level of ℎ. More specifically, this function estimates the minimum amount of labour required to 
produce a given level of output. The error term 𝜀 is decomposed into two separate parts 
(𝜇 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑣) as per the seminal paper by Aigner et al (1977), representing technical efficiency 𝜇 and 
factors beyond the control of firm 𝑣 (such as seasonal variations in output demand, change in 
government policies and political unrest, etc.). In addition to these two factors, the firms’ 
production technology will also have an impact upon their demand for labour. If the 𝜇 
component of the error term for any observation is greater than zero, the firm displays a level of 
technical inefficiency in labour use, meaning that the individual firm has used more labour than 
was technically the minimum necessary in order to produce a given level of output. A firm, which 
displays a 𝜇 value of zero, can claim to be fully efficient in the use of labour. The 𝑣 component 
of the error term can be both positive and negative (i.e. those factors which are not in the control 
of the firm could have a positive or negative effect on the firm demand for labour and 
operational efficiency). It is worth mentioning that due to the presence of 𝑣, the labour demand 
frontier is stochastic even when μ is set to zero. 
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We could extend the above function (1) by including employment variance (risk) in the labour 
requirement functions by following the work of Just and Pope (1978). We would like to refer to 
Heshmati (2001) for more detail on the extension of the stochastic component of equation (1). 
By doing so, equation (1) then becomes:  
 
ℎ = 𝑓(𝑥;  𝛼)  𝑒𝑥𝑝( g (𝑥;  𝛽) 𝜀)        (2) 
 
Where the first part, 𝑥 = (𝑦, 𝑤, 𝑞, 𝑧, 𝑡), with 𝑓(𝑥; 𝛼) representing the demand for labour part, 
and the second, representing the employment variance component of the labour demand 
function. By following other similar studies, the model can also be re-specified in log linear form 
as: 
 
𝑙𝑛 ℎ = 𝑙𝑛  𝑓(𝑥;  𝛼)  + g (𝑥;  𝛽) 𝜀     (3) 
Heshmati (2001) derived the expected value and variance of the above function (3) and 
subsequently derived and discussed the implication on marginal variance (risk) effects with 
respect to output and inputs (see page 426 of the above mentioned paper for details). 
 
3.2 Empirical estimation strategy 
We chose output and inputs in accordance with the existing literature. The specific variables used 
in the empirical analysis include the total quantity of labour hours used (h), output (y) measured 
by quantity of cement produced and sold, the hourly labour wage rates (w), capital (q), age of 
the firm (years since operation), a public sector firm dummy variable, an exporter dummy 
variable and time dummies representing exogenous rates of technological change (t). Nominal 
monetary values are converted into constant 2001 prices. The ‘wage’ variable is defined as hourly 
wages – an aggregate measure of the cost associated with the hiring of labour, including payroll 
taxes. The quasi-fixed asset variable, q (capital), is representative of the production capacity 
constraints.  
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The translog regression model outlined below was subsequently estimated on the population of 
the Pakistani cement manufacturing firms. In common with similar studies such as Jaffry et al 
(2008), a flexible translog functional form is used to approximate 𝑓(. ) and g(. ). Following Jaffry 
et al in the case of the subcontinents banking industries, we estimate common labour demand and 
efficiency irrespective of ownership types, area of operation, and size of the firm over both pre 
and post privatization time periods. The translog labour demand model can be specified as: 
 
𝑙𝑛 ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0  + 𝛼𝑦 𝑙𝑛 𝑦𝑖𝑡  + 𝛼𝑤  𝑙𝑛 𝑤𝑖𝑡  +  𝛼𝑞 𝑙𝑛 𝑞𝑖𝑡   + 𝜆𝑡  + 𝛿𝑖  +  
1
2
 {𝛼𝑦𝑦 𝑙𝑛 𝑦
2
𝑖𝑡  +
 𝛼𝑤𝑤  𝑙𝑛 𝑤
2
𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑞𝑞 𝑙𝑛 𝑞
2
𝑖𝑡}  + 𝛼𝑦𝑞 𝑙𝑛 𝑦𝑖𝑡  𝑙𝑛 𝑞𝑖𝑡  +  𝛼𝑤𝑦 𝑙𝑛 𝑤𝑖𝑡  𝑙𝑛 𝑦𝑖𝑡  +
 𝛼𝑤𝑞 𝑙𝑛 𝑤𝑖𝑡  𝑙𝑛 𝑞𝑖𝑡  +  𝛼𝑝𝑢𝑏  𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 + 𝛼𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑎𝑔𝑒 +  𝛼𝑒𝑥𝑝 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 + {𝛽𝑦𝑙𝑛 𝑦𝑖𝑡  +
 𝛽𝑤𝑙𝑛 𝑤𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽𝑞𝑙𝑛 𝑞𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝𝑢𝑏 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑙𝑛 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑝 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡} [𝜇𝑖𝑡  𝑣𝑖𝑡]  
                                                                          (4) 
where ℎ, 𝑦 𝑤 and 𝑞 are variables defined and discussed as above, i is an index of sample firms 
(𝑖 =  1, 2, … , 𝑁), 𝑡 represents an index of time (𝑡 =  1, 2, … , 𝑁). A vector of time dummies 
𝜆𝑡 (representing the exogenous rate of technological change) and firm dummies 𝛿𝑖  (representing 
heterogeneity across firms) are used alongside other variables. We do not assume that an 
inefficient firm would remain inefficient or that the same firms would act as an efficiency leader 
for many years. Hence, in order to accommodate the fact that the most efficient firm could 
change in each time period (sample year), time variant technical labour efficiency scores are 
calculated following Schmidt and Sickles’ (1984) and Heshmati (2001) framework, where 
technical inefficiency (TINEFF) is derived such as: 
 
      𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡 =  g (𝑥𝑖𝑡  ;  𝛽) (𝛼0  +  𝜇𝑖𝑡)  −  𝑚𝑖𝑛 [ g  (𝑥𝑖𝑡  ;  β) (α0  +   𝜇𝑖𝑡)]  
= (𝛽𝑦𝑙𝑛 𝑦𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽𝑤𝑙𝑛 𝑤𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽𝑞𝑙𝑛 𝑞𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝𝑢𝑏 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑙𝑛 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡  +
 𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑝 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡) (α0  +  𝜇𝑖𝑡)  −  𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑡 [(𝛽𝑦𝑙𝑛 𝑦𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽𝑤𝑙𝑛 𝑤𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽𝑞𝑙𝑛 𝑞𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽𝑡 +
𝛽𝑝𝑢𝑏 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑙𝑛 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑝 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡) (α0  +  𝜇𝑖𝑡)]  
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                                                                                                          (5) 
and relative labour use technical efficiency (𝑇𝐸𝐹𝐹) is calculated as: 
𝑇𝐸𝐹𝐹 = 𝐸𝑋𝑃 (− 𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡) 
   (6) 
A priori, we expect 𝛼𝑦 and 𝛼𝑞 regression coefficients of equation (4) to be positive and 𝛼𝑤 
negative, which are interpreted as the elasticity of labour demand with respect to: output, capital 
input and wages respectively. These expectations are mainly valid at the average data point, with 
the corresponding elasticities (which are both firm specific and time specific) outlined below: 
 
𝐸𝑦 =
𝜕 𝑙𝑛 ℎ𝑖𝑡
𝜕 𝑙𝑛 𝑦𝑖𝑡
 =  𝛼𝑦 +  2 𝛼𝑦𝑦 𝑙𝑛 𝑦𝑖𝑡  +  𝛼𝑦𝑤  𝑙𝑛 𝑤𝑖𝑡  + 𝛼𝑦𝑞 𝑙𝑛 𝑞𝑖𝑡 
(7)  
 𝐸𝑤 =
𝜕 𝑙𝑛 ℎ𝑖𝑡
𝜕 𝑙𝑛 𝑤𝑖𝑡
 =  𝛼𝑤 +  2 𝛼𝑤𝑤  𝑙𝑛 𝑤𝑖𝑡  +  𝛼𝑦𝑤  𝑙𝑛 𝑦𝑖𝑡  +  𝛼𝑤𝑞 𝑙𝑛 𝑞𝑖𝑡 
                                  (8) 
 
𝐸𝑞 =
𝜕 𝑙𝑛 ℎ𝑖𝑡
𝜕 𝑙𝑛 𝑞𝑖𝑡
 =  𝛼𝑞 +  2 𝛼𝑞𝑞 𝑙𝑛 𝑞𝑖𝑡  +  𝛼𝑦𝑞 𝑙𝑛 𝑦𝑖𝑡  +  𝛼𝑤𝑞𝑙𝑛 𝑤𝑖𝑡 
(9) 
Similarly, time specific elasticity of labour demand with respect to time (the exogenous rate of 
technological change) is derived as:  
𝐸𝑡 =
𝜕 𝑙𝑛 ℎ𝑖𝑡
𝜕 𝑡
 =  (𝜆𝑡 − 𝜆𝑡−1) 
              (10) 
By using equation (7), return to scale could be calculated as 
1
𝐸𝑦
. For further detailed explanation 
of this methodology and empirical estimation framework, we encourage reader to consult 
Heshmati (2001) study. 
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4.  Data 
Historical data on cement output, input quantities (values), cement prices and firms’ 
characteristics were obtained through company annual reports, site visits, interaction with 
government ministries, personal contacts and telephone interviews with concerned regulatory 
authorities and the All Pakistan Cement Manufacturers Association (APCMA). The final panel 
data set used in this paper comprises data from the period 1986 to 2011 for the public, privatized 
and private sector firms. Our data set is comprised of firms covering 98% of the industry in the 
pre and post privatization time periods. More importantly, due to the very long nature of the post 
privatization sample period (two decades), we are able to evaluate the longer-term impact of 
broader reforms including privatization on industry labour demand, adjustments and efficiencies. 
As discussed before, this study is unique on this issue as far as we are aware. We eliminated less 
than 1% of observations due to unexpected values (outliers) before the estimation stage. The 
panel is unbalanced as not all firms were in existence throughout the sample years covered by this 
study. Many private firms only began their operations after 1991. Summary statistics of the data 
are presented in Table 1 below.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
5.  Estimation and Explanation 
The first step in our estimation strategy of the model presented in Equation (4) is to determine 
the labour demand function for Pakistani cement manufacturing firms. Table 2 contains 
estimates of the demand function, (𝑓) and the variance function, ( g ). We estimated variance 
function ( g ), discussed and outlined above, by using the weighted non-linear method. The 
majority of the firm specific variables are statistically significant and hence different from zero. 
These regression estimates are subsequently used to calculate firm and time specific elasticities of 
labour demand with respect to outputs, wages and capital (fixed assets).  
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[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Table 3 contains median values of elasticity estimates by firm characteristics such as size and 
ownership types as well as by time periods. Size categories of firms are based on the average 
number of full-time employees. We classify a firm as very small if it employs less than 300 
employees, small with 301 to 500, medium with 501 to 700, large with 701 to 900 and very large 
for employing > 900 employees. These estimates reveal that, except for wage and time trend, all 
elasticities are positive at the median data point. This indicates that firms did respond in their 
demand for labour to changes in the output, wages and capital levels. The labour demand 
elasticity with respect to the output is positive for all sizes of firm (extremely small, small, 
medium, large and very large). This is also true of the three ownership categories (public, private 
and privatized) firms. All these findings are as per our expectations. The output median elasticity 
of 0.32 is not very low and had steadily increased over time suggesting that firms maintained their 
intensity of labour use over time. We could also infer from this estimate that the degree of 
elasticity is very unlikely to be significantly different across the number of firms included in the 
sample, thus exhibiting a marginal change in output will have a significant marginal effect on 
labour demand. 
 
The sign of the wage elasticity variable is consistent with theory too, and the temporal pattern of 
change indicates that labour demand is becoming cyclical and less responsive to changes in the 
wage rates in the later period of the sample period. Interestingly, the magnitude of –0.180 is the 
largest of the input elasticities. The yearly estimates also indicate that the wage elasticity increased 
immediately after deregulation (increasing from -0.068 in 1986 to –0.30 in 1995). Hence, it 
implies that further reduction in the workforce would prove relatively difficult due to the non-
availability of skilled labour during the high demand period when demand for cement goes up 
due to good economic growth or an increase in export potential to neighbouring countries and 
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the Middle East (two of the main export markets in the last few years when some firms exported 
a large quantity of cement to Afghanistan and UAE.).  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Contrary to wage elasticity, the elasticity with respect to capital is estimated with less precision 
with a median value of -0.06. There is a clear trend in the elasticity, initially starting at -0.024 in 
the first year of the sample (1986) and ending at -0.115 in 2010-11. This temporal pattern 
indicates a decreasing demand for labour with an increase in the book value of assets (capital). 
The negative sign is also an indication of capital being substituted for labour. The use of more 
capital is an indication of the modernization of the production process which in turn would 
require less labour. The sample median value of technical change (consisting only of neutral 
component changes) over time is -0.05, indicating some positive technical progress (a slight 
decrease in labour usage over time). Technical change fluctuates from positive to negative with a 
negative trend established for many years at a time indicating consistent positive technical 
development during those years. This technical progress is similar to the conclusions in Ghulam 
and Jaffry (2015) and as expected due to a massive investment by producers on production 
technology upgrade and capacity additions.  
 
The magnitude of output elasticities seems to vary with the size of the individual firm in the 
sample. The labour demand elasticity with respect to wages seems to increase as firm size 
increases. This suggests that increased wage levels do not constitute a strong barrier to the hiring 
of additional labour for larger firms, as opposed to their smaller counterparts. This could be due 
to the fact that larger size firms would still keep a higher number of workers to meet higher 
output demand in future despite an increase in wage rates. The elasticity, with respect to output, 
does not decrease with firm size, showing that larger firms are in a better position to expand their 
output without having a large impact on their labour demand. The labour demand elasticity with 
respect to capital seems to fall with the size of the firms, indicating that growth in capacity 
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alongside moving to new technology requires less additional labour for larger firms. Finally, the 
time trend shows a remarkably consistent pattern of technical progress irrespective of the size of 
firm, showing that this progress, shown over the sample period, has not been largely limited to 
firms of a specific size.  
 
In terms of elasticities differentiated by ownership of the firm, different ownership firms have 
similar labour demand elasticity with respect to output, but significantly less than one. This is 
expected, given the fact that the firms have already quite significant salaries bills in their overall 
cost structure and further expansion is likely to lead to some reduction in employment.  
  
Following Heshmati (2001), one of the advantages of our estimation strategy is that we could 
estimate employment variance (risk). The second part of Table 2 contains parameter estimates of 
this employment variance function. The estimates show that the beta coefficient with respect to 
output is positive and statistically significant. Interestingly, the wage coefficient, although 
positive, is statistically insignificant. The same is the case for exporter firms too. For all other 
variables such as for capital, time trend, public sector firm dummy and age of the firms, variance 
coefficients are positive and statistically significant. Subsequently, by using estimates presented in 
Table 2, we calculate the employment variance elasticity or marginal risk effects with respect to 
the dispersion factors of ‘output’, inputs (‘wages’ and ‘capital’) and ‘time trend’. We calculate 
median values separately for each time period, and ownership types and these values are reported 
in Table 3.  
 
The marginal employment variance (risk) effect evaluated at the median of the data with respect 
to ‘output’, is positive in both pre and post reform periods. It implies that any sample firm that is 
producing levels that are close to the sample median, the employment variance would increase if 
that firm produces more output. But interestingly, this employment risk has come down 
significantly over time and in particular from 1997 to 2011. It probably also indicates that further 
adjustment to employment would not be possible, given the replacement of old technology with 
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a newer model and adjustment in employment may have already taken place in earlier periods. 
For public firms, this employment risk is the largest however negative. For capital, this is also 
true irrespective of the ownership type and the time period. The variable ‘wages’ is the most 
crucial factor contributing to the variance of employment in terms of marginal effects. 
Interestingly, the employment risk with respect to wages has come down since the initiation of 
reforms in 1991/92. Significantly, more variations in the estimated marginal effects seem to take 
place as firm size increases. 
 
Equation 6 is used to estimate individual firm level labour use technical efficiency for each time 
period. This is a relative measure of firm performance in a particular year as it is relative to the 
best performing firm in that year. The best (benchmark) firm is supposed to be 100% efficient. 
The frequency distribution of technical efficiency is reported in Figure 1. A significant number of 
firms are found in the intervals of between 80% and 90% labour utilization efficiency scores. 
Starting with industry performance in terms of utilization of labour, the overall median technical 
efficiency is 87%. It means that on average, the industry, without any reduction in output, could 
have reduced labour usage by 13%. Nonetheless, this is indicative of a relatively high level of 
median labour use efficiency and similar to that observed by Heshmati (2001) in the study of 
Swedish savings banks. It is extremely high, when compared with that observed in the Tunisian 
banking sector study by Chaffai (1997). On the other hand, these estimates also indicate that the 
differences between top and low performer firms are relatively small.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Interestingly, labour use efficiency estimates also reveal that there appears to be no obvious 
difference in technical efficiency scores between firms of different sizes with the exception of 
medium size firms. The estimates indicate that the largest firms could reduce their labour demand 
on average by around 9% without reduction in efficiency, with the smaller firms only requiring 
around an 8% reduction at the median. Therefore, there is a remarkably narrow gap between the 
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optimal level of labour efficiency and that which is observed by the firms. Similarly, among firms 
of different ownership types, the efficiency estimates indicate that private firms are relatively less 
efficient in terms of labour usage, followed by public firms. Private firms could have reduced 
their labour usage by roughly 17%, public by 11% and privatized by only 9%. Hence, private 
firms were employing far more labour than is technically necessary given output levels, hence, 
this group of firms has some way to go before significantly improving labour use technical 
efficiency levels.  
 
Further analysis of temporal patterns in elasticities and efficiencies by ownership 
Firm specific labour use efficiencies and elasticities of labour demand with respect to output, 
wages, capital and time trend are calculated and median estimates presented in Table 4 by 
significant time periods and ownership types. We divide the post privatization time period into 
two sub-periods. The period 1992-96 covers the immediate impact period of the start of the 
privatization programme and 1997-2011, the longer-term impact of the policy. The period 1986-
91 is comprised of a pre privatization time span. Table 4 also contains estimates of the overall 
post privatization time period (1992-2011) for the sake of comparison. 
 
Some interesting observations can be made by looking at these median estimates over significant 
time periods. Public sector firms, before their eventual privatization, become less labour 
responsive after 1992. Elasticity of output for public sector firms was reduced from 0.479 in 1986 
to 0.36 in 2003. These estimates were in fact 0.516 and 0.440 for the periods 1986-91 and 1997-
2011. However, there was no change for the immediate post reforms period. The estimates for 
the 1997-onward time period, however, should be interpreted with some caution because there 
were only two firms left under public ownership from 1997 (Mustehkam and Javeden). Contrary 
to public sector firms, output elasticities of privatized firms did not change over the entire post 
reforms period (1992-2011) compared to pre reforms period of 1986-91 (marginally increasing 
from 0.51 to 0.53). Nonetheless, privatization and broader reforms did not have any significant 
effect on the employment response, for these firms. Interestingly, output elasticity for private 
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firms significantly increased from 0.41 during 1986-91 to 0.57 during 1997-2011 with no 
immediate impact (1992-96).  
   
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
When it comes to labour adjustment in response to wages, the elasticities pattern over time 
reveals some interesting trends. Immediately after reforms, firms responded in accordance to 
predictions and wage elasticity kept rising until 1997. But then, afterwards, it came down for 
privatized as well as private sector firms. More specifically, these estimates for publically owned 
firms show a significant increase during 1992-96 compared to 1986-91 (-0.10 to -0.27) but have 
come down from 1997- onward (-0.12 during 1997-2011). For privatized firms, these estimates 
increased from -0.10 to -0.20 immediately after privatization of these firms and settled at -0.15 
during 1997-2011. By 1998, firms would have made changes in their labour usage and the 
shedding of additional workers would have been damaging to the long-term competitiveness of 
the firms. Interestingly, private firms experienced the highest increase from a mere -0.02 during 
1986-91 to -0.23 during 1997-2011 (a tenfold increase and higher than other firms). 
 
 The intensity of the relationship between labour demand and capital is relatively weaker over the 
shorter as well as longer post reforms periods but interesting nonetheless. The elasticity estimates 
presented in Table 4 reveals that, for publically owned firms, capital elasticity increased from -
0.02 during 1986-91 to -0.06 during 1992-96 but has been almost zero since then. For privatized 
firms, this elasticity increased from -0.02 during 1986-91 to -0.06 during 1997-2011. Again, more 
interestingly, for private firms, estimates show the highest increase from a mere -0.02 to -0.10 
during longer post privatization time periods.  
 
Table 4 also contains the median values of labour use technical efficiency scores by different time 
periods and ownership types. What is disappointingly apparent from investigating the changes in 
labour use efficiency over time is that median technical efficiency is continuously decreasing over 
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time (see Figure 2). For example, in 1986 (the year our investigation started), the median firm 
achieved 88% labour use efficiency, compared with 77% in the final year of the sample period 
(11% reduction). The yearly trends indicate that year on year negative change has been largest in 
the last fourteen years (1998 to 2011). Whether this was a result of the reforms, including 
privatization, needs further investigation. All this could have easily translated into higher prices of 
cement or reduction in margins during this period. Additionally, firms would have suffered losses 
too as a result of falling efficiencies. Ahluwalia (2002) suggests that a failure to live up to the full 
potential of privatization might not be down to changes in policies themselves, but a failure to 
implement these policy changes correctly. It may be that better implementation of the 
privatization policy will enable the median firm in the sample to move closer to the efficiency 
frontier in the years to come. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
Interestingly, among firms of different ownership types, the efficiency estimates indicate that 
private firms were relatively less efficient in terms of labour usage before and after the reforms, 
compared to public firms (current and former). Hence, private firms were employing far more 
labour than is technically necessary given output levels. This group of firms also experienced the 
highest level of efficiency decline from 1997 to 2011 compared to the 1986-91 period (81% 
compared to 87%). Hence, this group of firms has some way to go in improving technical 
efficiency levels. Further, the efficiency estimates presented in Table 4 show that the group of 
public sector firms (current and former) were unable to improve their labour use efficiency over 
time. Initial efficiency gains (during 1992-96) were lost quickly and the overall trend appears to 
show no change compared to 1986-91.   
 
Determinants of labour use efficiency    
Firms’ labour use efficiency could have changed due to a variety of reasons rather than 
privatization and other broader reforms only. Hence, in order to perform a more detailed analysis 
of the above findings, and similarly to Jaffry et al (2008) and other studies, a second stage 
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regression was run in order to model a variety of other factors against the firm specific efficiency 
scores obtained and discussed in the previous section. In order to check for robustness in the 
estimates, five different specifications (which we refer to as model_1 – model_5) are estimated, 
with each involving the inclusion and exclusion of certain variables. The efficiency scores range 
from zero to one and hence, some studies have used Tobit regression to model determinants of 
efficiency. But, a few authors have quite recently advocated using simple OLS. We follow those 
studies and, due to the panel nature of our data, use a random effect regression model. Random 
effect regression is performed due to the fact that we do not assume that unobserved 
heterogeneity among different ownership firms is constant over time due to each firm behaving 
differently to changes in the economic, regulatory and market environment subsequent to 
reforms. The Hausman test of random versus fixed effect model confirmed this assumption.     
  
We specify our base model (model_1) by including variables representing firm size, production 
technology (advanced/old), ownership type (public, private and privatized), exporter status (if the 
firm has exported to neighbouring countries and the Middle East), profitability and productivity, 
working capital ratio, and ratio of overheads expenses to total expenses. We use the log of total 
assets as a proxy for firm size that would also take into account significant capacity addition by 
privatized as well as privately owned firms in the post privatization time period. The quality of 
the management is approximated by general and administrative expenses (overheads) as a % of 
total cost. Similarly, more profitable firms could hire less but use only quality labour. Profitability 
in this case is measured as a return on assets. There could also be a trickledown effect of other 
inputs productivity. We use total factor productivity as a measure of other inputs’ quality and 
productivity. We follow Galal et al (1994) to measure firms’ total factor productivity. Availability 
of working capital could help routine inspection and maintenance of machinery and equipment.  
 
To accommodate the learning by exporting element, we include a dummy variable equal to ‘1’ if 
the firm is an exporter and ‘0’ otherwise. The impact of superior technology is considered by 
adding a dummy variable equal to ‘1’ for a firm using the dry (advance) production process. The 
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proximity to export market and input sources is taken into account by a dummy variable equal to 
‘1’ for firms operating in the Pakistani northern region. Ownership effect is considered by adding 
two dummy variables for public and privatized firms. Finally, yearly dummies are added in these 
regression models to observe the impact of the post privatization time period on labour use 
efficiency. 
                    
The output from these five regression specifications is displayed in Table 5. Interestingly, the sign 
and significance of the variables do not seem to change dramatically between the five model 
specifications, highlighting that the model estimates are consistent and robust. After controlling 
for other firm specific factors, total assets have a positive and statistically significant coefficient, 
indicating that firms with larger assets (hence higher production capacity) tend to be more 
efficient in their use of labour. This result is an indication of potential scale economies. This 
could also be due to having the financial muscle to hire fewer in numbers but better quality 
production and administration/marketing workers. Firms spending more money on 
administration and marketing campaigns tend to be less efficient in their labour use. Having 
access to a higher level of working capital does not appear to have any significant effect on 
labour use efficiency. Financially profitable as well as productive firms (indicated by return on 
assets and total factor productivity variables) were on average using labour more efficiently.  
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Change of ownership from public to private (privatized in our case) has a positive impact on 
efficiency. This is consistent with other studies indicating an improvement after change of 
ownership. Hence, a reduction in workforce prior to selling these state owned firms had made 
these firms comparatively more efficient in particular compared to firms operating under private 
ownership. The variable, reflecting public sector ownership, does not appear to have consistent 
estimates in term of signs and statistical significance across the five different models. These firms 
experienced a decline in their labour use efficiency compared to firms operating in the private 
sector at least in our two specifications. Contrary to expectations, operating in the Pakistani 
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northern region with proximity to raw material and export market as well as using dry process 
technology appear to have a negative effect on labour use efficiency. Interestingly, exporter firms 
do not appear to have any advantage in term of labour utilization.  
 
Our regression estimates of yearly dummies, after controlling the firms’ specific factors 
mentioned above, supports the contention that the reforms had some positive effect initially 
(1992-97) but the trend has reversed in the later years of our sample period (2002 onward) and 
hence reforms have not encouraged firms to use labour more efficiently in the longer time period 
(with 2004-onward coefficients negative and statistically significant). This could be predominantly 
as a result of a relatively disappointing performance by public and private firms as discussed 
above. 
 
Robustness check 
In an effort to make sure that our findings are robust with respect to the different specifications 
of the labour demand function and influential observations of the data set used in this study, we 
carried out three robustness checks. These include: adding a new input variable (cost of capital 
approximated by depreciation cost), adding a time trend variable and its interaction with capital 
and output variables to incorporate the role of technological effect more specifically and 
dropping 1% more outlier observations. We do not report the results of these exercises here but 
generally speaking, these tests do not alter the main findings of our study qualitatively in terms of 
labour use efficiency estimates and other statistics discussed above. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
A widely accepted view in the early 1980s was that state-owned firms were using more workers 
compared to optimal levels for these firms and were less efficient in their overall input use 
including labour. Privatization and other broader reforms were aimed at reducing inefficiencies in 
input usage despite fear of widespread job losses as a result of the transfer of ownership from the 
public to private sector. There has been a constant flow of studies examining the impact of these 
24 
 
reforms on the financial and operational performance of privatized firms since the early 1980s 
when privatization policies were introduced in developing and developed countries. However, 
surprisingly, studies on the impact of reforms on labour use adjustments and efficiencies are few 
and less debated. The majority of the studies on labour use efficiencies using advanced 
econometric methods are not only few but mainly related to developed countries. 
 
Our study fills this gap and we analyse the long-term impact of privatization and other broader 
reforms introduced in 1992 on labour use efficiency and adjustments of the Pakistani cement 
industry. The choice of the cement industry in this regard is not only interesting and relevant for 
developing country such as Pakistan due to significant contribution in tax collection and 
employment generation but it has an international relevance too due to worldwide allegations of 
illegal practices such as collusions and cartels formation by cement manufacturers. Our sample of 
21 firms comprised of three ownerships: public, private and privatized covering the pre reforms 
period of 6 years (1986-91) and the two decades post reforms period (1992-2011). We believe 
that the coverage of post reforms period is the longest so far to explain longer run labour use 
adjustments and efficiencies after reforms and change of ownership. 
 
 By following Heshmati (2001) and similar to a cost function estimation, we estimate the labour 
demand function where the demand for labour is a function of wages, output, a quasi-fixed input 
(capital) and a time trend. We also include a number of other variables to account for firms’ 
heterogeneity in terms of age, technology, ownership types and exporting experience. 
Subsequently, we compute employment risk (variance), inputs/output labour demand elasticities 
and firm level labour use technical efficiencies. 
 
The magnitudes and signs of estimated input/output elasticities of the sample firms are broadly 
as expected. We observe that the largest labour demand elasticity is linked to wages. In terms of 
the temporal patterns of these elasticities, output elasticity increased significantly for private firms 
during 1997-2011 while, in comparison, there has been no such change for competitor privatized 
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firms. Wage and capital elasticities have also increased for private firms but this is also true of 
privatized firms. However, the magnitude of change is comparatively higher for private firms as 
compared to other ownership firms. The estimation of employment variance reveals that any 
sample firm that is producing levels that are close to the sample median, the employment 
variance would increase if that firm produces more output. But interestingly, this employment 
risk has come down since 1997. The workers’ wages appear to be the most crucial factor 
contributing to the risk of employment but again employment risk has come down since the 
initiation of privatization in 1991/92. Interestingly, employment risk seems to increase as firm 
size increases. 
 
The conclusions with regard to the level and trend in labour use technical efficiencies are very 
interesting and informative. There appear to be comparatively fewer variations in the efficiency 
levels of different ownerships and size firms. It was found that, broadly speaking, a median firm 
could have reduced its labour usage by 13%, without reduction in output. Interestingly, the initial 
impact of reforms was positive (in the first five years) for all firms irrespective of ownership. But 
since then there is no significant difference between pre and post reforms efficiency levels for 
publically owned and privatized firms. Surprisingly, private sector firms, however, experienced 
some decline in labour use efficiencies from 1997 onward. These estimates indicate that the 
policies enacted in the early 1990s in helping state owned firms to reduce their labour usage at 
least had a neutral long term effect but positive when compared to competitor private firms. Put 
it mildly, reforms has helped the privatized firms not to further over utilize labour and thus 
reduce efficiency compared to their private or state owned counterparts. But strictly speaking, it 
would appear that the significant broader reforms, including privatization, could have helped 
some particular industries such as the financial sector (see Jaffry et al (2008) for instance) in 
reducing the extent of over-utilization of labour, but we are unable to say the same in the case of 
the cement industry in Pakistan.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std dev. Minimum Maximum 
hours (h) 5127850 2963825 792000 18360000 
output (y) 0.73 0.86 0.00 6.55 
wages (w) 25.32 8.38 6.43 56.03 
capital [fixed assets] (q) 2528.22 2896.5 14.38 15140.4 
time trend (t) 13.98 7.38 1.00 26.00 
firm size (1=very small, 2=small, 3=medium, 4=large, 5=very large) 3.5 1.09 1.00 5.00 
firm type of ownership ( 1= public, 2= privatized, 3= private) 2.17 0.79 1.00 3.00 
firm age (years) 24.9 12.63 3.00 57.00 
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Table 2: Generalized Least Square (GLS) nonlinear regression parameter estimates of the labour 
demand and the employment variance function  
 Parameter 
estimate 
Approx. 
std error 
t 
value 
Approx. 
Pr > |t| 
                          Parameter 
                         estimate 
Approx. 
std error 
t  
value 
Approx. 
Pr > 
|t| 
a. labour demand function estimates b. employment variance function 
constant  -1.163 0.434 -2.680 0.008 output (y) 0.073 0.013 5.720 .0001 
output (y) 0.869 0.059 14.850 <.0001 wages (w) 0.020 0.032 0.610 0.542 
wages (w) 0.583 0.098 5.960 <.0001 capital (q) 0.063 0.012 5.470 0001 
capital (q) -0.336 0.050 -6.670 <.0001 time trend (t) 0.101 
       
0.032 
        
3.190 0.002 
output*output (𝑦2) 
 
0.292 0.037 7.860 <.0001 public firm (dummy) 0.178 0.037 4.880 .0001 
wages*wages (𝑤2) 
 
0.262 0.104 2.520 0.012 exporter firm (dummy) -0.013 0.040 -0.330 0.738 
capital*capital (𝑞2) 
 
-0.071 0.023 -3.080 0.002 firm age (years) 0.054 0.011 4.790 .0001 
wages*output (wy) -0.313 0.097 -3.220 0.001      
output*capital (yq) -0.152 0.041 -3.690 0.000      
wages*capital (wq) -0.069 0.072 -0.960 0.337      
public firm (dummy) 0.156 0.067 2.340 0.020      
exporter firm (dummy) -0.414 0.055 -7.510 <.0001      
firm age (years) 0.567 0.140 4.050 <.0001      
          
Notes: firm and time dummy estimates excluded to conserve space. All variables except dummies are in logs. 
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Table 3: Median input/output labour demand elasticities and employment variance (risk)   
 a. labour demand elasticities  b. employment variance (risk)  c. efficiency 
 output wages capital time  output wages capital time   
            
overall 0.508 -0.152 -0.063 -0.051  0.019 0.005 -0.014 -0.034  0.871 
1986-91 0.487 -0.076 -0.024 -0.049  0.030 0.122 -0.044 -0.025  0.881 
1992-11 0.518 -0.199 -0.074 -0.055  0.018 -0.219 -0.009 -0.034  0.841 
1992-96 0.509 -0.189 -0.067 -0.051  0.053 -0.318 -0.065 -0.061  0.936 
1997-11 0.556 -0.209 -0.094 -0.059  0.002 -0.057 -0.006 -0.024  0.834 
public 0.491 -0.119 -0.036 -0.050  0.101 0.004 -0.072 -0.034  0.890 
privatized 0.520 -0.173 -0.066 -0.055  -0.001 -0.025 -0.012 -0.030  0.911 
private 0.504 -0.210 -0.070 -0.051  0.001 0.001 -0.006 -0.024  0.831 
very small 0.187 0.035 0.071 -0.051  0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000  0.890 
small 0.512 -0.287 -0.064 -0.055  0.007 -0.090 -0.007 -0.011  0.920 
medium 0.478 -0.196 -0.057 -0.050  0.015 0.023 -0.023 -0.033  0.832 
large 0.520 -0.201 -0.065 -0.051  0.044 -0.305 -0.036 -0.044  0.916 
very large 0.573 -0.103 -0.085 -0.051  -0.006 -0.356 -0.013 -0.026  0.890 
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Table 4: Input/output labour demand elasticities and labour use efficiency scores by selected time 
periods and ownership types 
 overall 1986-91 1992-2011 1992-96 1997-2011 
      
output elasticity 
public 0.493 0.506 0.456 0.505 0.440 
privatized 0.534  0.534 0.566 0.512 
Private 0.469 0.412 0.494 0.410 0.569 
      
wage elasticity 
public -0.129 -0.100 -0.160 -0.274 -0.120 
privatized -0.169  -0.169 -0.203 -0.152 
private -0.119 -0.022 -0.138 -0.102 -0.232 
      
capital elasticity 
public -0.032 -0.027 -0.037 -0.059 0.001 
privatized -0.063  -0.063 -0.079 -0.055 
private -0.056 -0.017 -0.076 -0.031 -0.103 
      
labour use efficiency 
public 0.887 0.887 0.892 0.913 0.866 
privatized 0.898  0.898 0.956 0.896 
private 0.836 0.870 0.828 0.925 0.813 
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Table 5: Random effect regression results (dependent variable: labour use efficiency scores)  
variables model_1 model_2 model_3 model_4 model_5 model_6 
size (log of assets) 0.01316*** 0.01787***  0.02010*** 0.01613*** 0.01098** 
overheads /total cost -0.00771 -0.40008***  -0.41701*** -0.40884*** -0.53108*** 
return on assets -0.05220*** 0.08841* 0.13890*** 0.12085*** 0.08208* 0.07719* 
total factor productivity 0.01360*** 0.01902* 0.02810**  0.01346 0.01187 
working capital ratio 0.00657* 0.0063 0.00428  0.00618 0.00274 
production technology = dry  -0.02599 -0.05904*** -0.07343*** -0.05672***  -0.07380*** 
operating area = north -0.07849** -0.06095***  -0.05867*** -0.06837***  
firm is exporter -0.01197** -0.0141  -0.01437  -0.00279 
ownership = public 0.03542 0.00245 -0.02546 0.00146 -0.05353*** -0.03273* 
ownership = privatized 0.07696 0.05979*** 0.04462*** 0.05872*** 0.09741*** 0.03168** 
time period -0.00528***      
Constant 0.83399*** 0.76166*** 0.82020*** 0.77447*** 0.72210*** 0.80910*** 
       
 yearly dummies 
1987  0.03663 0.02167 0.04636 0.03971 0.04331 
1988  0.04093 0.02978 0.04843* 0.04300 0.04663 
1989  0.04487 0.03685 0.05385* 0.04651 0.0502 
1990  0.04388 0.03923 0.05179* 0.04346 0.05061* 
1991  0.04302 0.04518 0.05166* 0.04299 0.05024* 
1992  0.06589** 0.06233* 0.07552** 0.07427** 0.07345** 
1993  0.05340* 0.04671 0.06486** 0.06394** 0.06580** 
1994  0.05678* 0.04891 0.06710** 0.06620** 0.06985** 
1995  0.04841* 0.03532 0.06137** 0.05885* 0.06162* 
1996  0.05984* 0.06873** 0.07350*** 0.06922** 0.07373** 
1997  0.06770** 0.08210** 0.08074*** 0.07734** 0.07696** 
1998  0.00845 0.02481 0.01797 0.02114 0.01498 
1999  0.00325 0.01976 0.01335 0.01422 0.00947 
2000  0.0125 0.02721 0.01877 0.01949 0.01758 
2001  0.00551 0.02644 0.01093 0.0133 0.0123 
2002  -0.00171 0.00939 0.00815 0.00379 0.00632 
2003  -0.0064 0.00363 0.00166 -0.00157 -0.00055 
2004  -0.01588 -0.00516 -0.00796 -0.01284 -0.00887 
2005  -0.03196 -0.01358 -0.02598 -0.02722 -0.0195 
2006  -0.05891** -0.03911 -0.05184* -0.05467* -0.04561 
2007  -0.06488** -0.04065 -0.06643** -0.06425** -0.05797* 
2008  -0.0443 -0.02967 -0.05021* -0.04868* -0.03767 
2009  -0.05638* -0.04534 -0.05897** -0.05646* -0.04754* 
2010  -0.04411 -0.03316 -0.05200* -0.0461 -0.03626 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
